Abstract
This thesis seeks to explore why and how mafias expand to new territories, and under which conditions they engage in governing activities, such as protection or control of markets, as opposed to trading activities, such as drug trafficking and money laundering. It also tries to understand under which conditions mafias fail to expand across territories. To do so, it tests hypotheses derived from the theory against three case studies documenting the presence of the Calabrian mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, in Germany. The analysis is based on a wide range of hard-to-reach sources, some of which have never been analysed before. This includes judicial data, intelligence reports, archival documents, open-source data, and interviews. Three main findings emerge. First, while migration waves have not pushed mafiosi to migrate, the presence of diaspora communities create structural opportunities for mafiosi to govern, as mafiosi operate at comparatively lower costs within communities of their own compatriots, taking advantage of tightly knit networks of kinship and ethnicity. Second, the presence of policing blind-spots in the new territory enables both governing and trading activities by mafiosi, as they gradually adapt to local conditions following a learning process based on past experience. Thereby, mafiosi remain under the radar of the police and integrate into local communities. Third, moderate levels of trust in the new territory further facilitate mafia entrenchment, ultimately resulting in dynamics of converging interests typical of traditional mafia territories. More generally, the analysis shows that mafia expansion into new territories is not the result of a conscious decision to expand nor a mechanical product of structural conditions but entails a strategic dimension both from the perspective of the criminal group and the state.
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