%0 Book %1 goldberg2021lobbying %A Goldberg, Felix %D 2021 %I Universität Stuttgart %K corruption integrity lobbying myown %R 10.18419/OPUS-11794 %T Lobbying and Political Corruption in Germany and the United States: Legitimacy, Strategies, Influence and Integrity in Interest Intermediation %U https://elib.uni-stuttgart.de/handle/11682/11811 %X The objective of this study is to provide theoretical and empirical guidance for sound lobbying regulation by assessing the relationship between democratically desired and undue influence. The distinction between lobbying and corruption as two ways of influence-seeking is right at the center of differentiating desired influence from undue influence. This study is the first to comprehensively examine the relationship between lobbying and corruption in two affluent democracies. I argue that a cooperative style of policymaking, such as in Germany, inhibits corruption because of mutual control mechanisms. In contrast, I expect a majoritarian style of policymaking to facilitate corruption because it concentrates power in the hands of the executive leadership and increases competition among organized interests and legislators. The empirical results support this expectation. Turning to the hypotheses concerning the individual level, lobbying and corruption can be conceptualized as either mutually inclusive or exclusive activities. Concerning the former, shared prerequisites of lobbying and corruption can lead to a positive statistical relationship. Concerning the latter, corruption is attempted if lobbying is not successful. The results for the individual level are inconclusive. Access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of corruption and the strongest predictor of influence through lobbying. Hence, better access increases the two types of influence. However, influence at the executive branch is negatively associated with corruption. This indicates that access is a prerequisite for both lobbying and corruption and that the choice between the two ways of seeking influence is made later, after access was granted. In contrast, better personal access to the legislature is rather negatively associated with corruption. The weaker relationship between contact with legislators and corruption indicates that public scrutiny and mutual controls are effective tools against corruption. Hence, there is no unambiguous empirical support for either the mutual-inclusiveness or the mutual-exclusiveness logic.

@book{goldberg2021lobbying, abstract = {The objective of this study is to provide theoretical and empirical guidance for sound lobbying regulation by assessing the relationship between democratically desired and undue influence. The distinction between lobbying and corruption as two ways of influence-seeking is right at the center of differentiating desired influence from undue influence. This study is the first to comprehensively examine the relationship between lobbying and corruption in two affluent democracies. I argue that a cooperative style of policymaking, such as in Germany, inhibits corruption because of mutual control mechanisms. In contrast, I expect a majoritarian style of policymaking to facilitate corruption because it concentrates power in the hands of the executive leadership and increases competition among organized interests and legislators. The empirical results support this expectation. Turning to the hypotheses concerning the individual level, lobbying and corruption can be conceptualized as either mutually inclusive or exclusive activities. Concerning the former, shared prerequisites of lobbying and corruption can lead to a positive statistical relationship. Concerning the latter, corruption is attempted if lobbying is not successful. The results for the individual level are inconclusive. Access to the executive branch is the strongest predictor of corruption and the strongest predictor of influence through lobbying. Hence, better access increases the two types of influence. However, influence at the executive branch is negatively associated with corruption. This indicates that access is a prerequisite for both lobbying and corruption and that the choice between the two ways of seeking influence is made later, after access was granted. In contrast, better personal access to the legislature is rather negatively associated with corruption. The weaker relationship between contact with legislators and corruption indicates that public scrutiny and mutual controls are effective tools against corruption. Hence, there is no unambiguous empirical support for either the mutual-inclusiveness or the mutual-exclusiveness logic.}, added-at = {2021-12-06T09:25:44.000+0100}, author = {Goldberg, Felix}, biburl = {https://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/26d1bcc28f86fdc1f840bcf6d1cab4308/fgoldberg}, doi = {10.18419/OPUS-11794}, interhash = {6064364740de71495f2360b799f519a1}, intrahash = {6d1bcc28f86fdc1f840bcf6d1cab4308}, keywords = {corruption integrity lobbying myown}, publisher = {Universität Stuttgart}, timestamp = {2021-12-06T08:57:51.000+0100}, title = {Lobbying and Political Corruption in Germany and the United States: Legitimacy, Strategies, Influence and Integrity in Interest Intermediation}, url = {https://elib.uni-stuttgart.de/handle/11682/11811}, year = 2021 }