What is the aim of science? Some would say that scientists want to offer true descriptions of the world. Apparently, scientific observations and experiments help toachieve this aim. They yield data to check scientific hypotheses. But do we really have decisive evidence at our disposal?
Observational and experimental practicescrucially depend on
instruments of different kinds. For example, the discovery
ofthe Higgs boson did not only presuppose the world‘s
largest particle accelerator,the LHC, but also various
detecting technologies. This discovery seems to be a
bigsuccess in the history of science. Other experimental
results, however, that were noless depending on scientific
instruments and formerly also regarded as
importantscientific achievements turned out to be complete
failures. For instance, no astrophysicist talks about
Martian canals today. They were artefacts of
observationalpractices – of biased interpretations. Yet
what exactly tells us that the detection ofthe Higgs boson
wasn‘t similarly biased?This talk is an introduction to
the problem of theory-ladenness of observationwhich is
lurking in the background. What exactly is it about? How is
it related tothe social embedding of scientific practices?
%0 Conference Paper
%1 moessner2017observations
%A Mößner, Nicola
%D 2017
%K beobachtung desy epistemologie philosophie tagungsbeitrag wissenschaftsphilosophy
%R 10.3204/PUBDB-2017-01125
%T Let’s have a look – observations, theories, philosophical troubles
%U https://bib-pubdb1.desy.de/record/318131
%X What is the aim of science? Some would say that scientists want to offer true descriptions of the world. Apparently, scientific observations and experiments help toachieve this aim. They yield data to check scientific hypotheses. But do we really have decisive evidence at our disposal?
Observational and experimental practicescrucially depend on
instruments of different kinds. For example, the discovery
ofthe Higgs boson did not only presuppose the world‘s
largest particle accelerator,the LHC, but also various
detecting technologies. This discovery seems to be a
bigsuccess in the history of science. Other experimental
results, however, that were noless depending on scientific
instruments and formerly also regarded as
importantscientific achievements turned out to be complete
failures. For instance, no astrophysicist talks about
Martian canals today. They were artefacts of
observationalpractices – of biased interpretations. Yet
what exactly tells us that the detection ofthe Higgs boson
wasn‘t similarly biased?This talk is an introduction to
the problem of theory-ladenness of observationwhich is
lurking in the background. What exactly is it about? How is
it related tothe social embedding of scientific practices?
@inproceedings{moessner2017observations,
abstract = {What is the aim of science? Some would say that scientists want to offer true descriptions of the world. Apparently, scientific observations and experiments help toachieve this aim. They yield data to check scientific hypotheses. But do we really have decisive evidence at our disposal?
Observational and experimental practicescrucially depend on
instruments of different kinds. For example, the discovery
ofthe Higgs boson did not only presuppose the world‘s
largest particle accelerator,the LHC, but also various
detecting technologies. This discovery seems to be a
bigsuccess in the history of science. Other experimental
results, however, that were noless depending on scientific
instruments and formerly also regarded as
importantscientific achievements turned out to be complete
failures. For instance, no astrophysicist talks about
Martian canals today. They were artefacts of
observationalpractices – of biased interpretations. Yet
what exactly tells us that the detection ofthe Higgs boson
wasn‘t similarly biased?This talk is an introduction to
the problem of theory-ladenness of observationwhich is
lurking in the background. What exactly is it about? How is
it related tothe social embedding of scientific practices?},
added-at = {2020-07-20T10:35:41.000+0200},
author = {Mößner, Nicola},
biburl = {https://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/2e52d81b61b01b25e74b42ef3f922bac2/droessler},
doi = {10.3204/PUBDB-2017-01125},
interhash = {9371d72bc16b04f65121d0bdd17bc261},
intrahash = {e52d81b61b01b25e74b42ef3f922bac2},
keywords = {beobachtung desy epistemologie philosophie tagungsbeitrag wissenschaftsphilosophy},
organization = {SFB-676 Student Council Evening Lecture, Hamburg (Germany)},
pid = {G:(DE-H253)DFG-SFB-676-MGK},
pnm = {SFB 676-MGK - Integrated Research Training Group (IRTG)
(DFG-SFB-676)},
reportid = {PUBDB-2017-01125},
school = {Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron, DESY},
subtyp = {Invited},
timestamp = {2020-07-20T08:35:41.000+0200},
title = {{L}et’s have a look – observations, theories, philosophical troubles},
typ = {PUB:(DE-HGF)31},
url = {https://bib-pubdb1.desy.de/record/318131},
year = 2017
}