PUMA publications for /user/ziegma/PoWihttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/user/ziegma/PoWiPUMA RSS feed for /user/ziegma/PoWi2024-03-28T13:17:54+01:00The Freedom House Survey for 2016: The Dual Threat of Populists and Autocratshttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/2561919b2b259bf19aad85b4a926f5af9/ziegmaziegma2018-06-08T17:11:19+02:00autokratien demokratie globalisierung populismus powi <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Arch Puddington" itemprop="url" href="/person/108a20569a02d2a76711177636c694dd6/author/0"><span itemprop="name">A. Puddington</span></a></span>, </span> und <span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Tyler Roylance" itemprop="url" href="/person/108a20569a02d2a76711177636c694dd6/author/1"><span itemprop="name">T. Roylance</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information"><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationIssue" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><em><span itemprop="journal">Journal of Democracy</span>, </em> <em><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationVolume" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><span itemprop="volumeNumber">28 </span></span>(<span itemprop="issueNumber">2</span>):
<span itemprop="pagination">105-119</span></em> </span>(<em><span>April 2017<meta content="April 2017" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Fri Jun 08 17:11:19 CEST 2018Journal of DemocracyApril2105-119The Freedom House Survey for 2016: The Dual Threat of Populists and Autocrats
282017autokratien demokratie globalisierung populismus powi The KOF Globalisation Index – Revisitedhttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/2566230fde028a320398d49d9711aecec/ziegmaziegma2018-05-20T18:54:03+02:00GlobalisationIndex Globalisierung PoWi <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Savina Gygli" itemprop="url" href="/person/1db4079b1baad410024b53f57ae2369a6/author/0"><span itemprop="name">S. Gygli</span></a></span>, </span><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Florian Haelg" itemprop="url" href="/person/1db4079b1baad410024b53f57ae2369a6/author/1"><span itemprop="name">F. Haelg</span></a></span>, </span> und <span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Jan-Egbert Sturm" itemprop="url" href="/person/1db4079b1baad410024b53f57ae2369a6/author/2"><span itemprop="name">J. Sturm</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information">(<em><span>2018<meta content="2018" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Sun May 20 18:54:03 CEST 2018KOF Working PapersThe KOF Globalisation Index – RevisitedWorking Paper4392018GlobalisationIndex Globalisierung PoWi The Evidence on Globalisationhttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/27265e70f494aad0aa2da36f96546df51/ziegmaziegma2018-05-20T18:41:32+02:00Globalisierung KOF PoWi <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Niklas Potrafke" itemprop="url" href="/person/1166a0b90df8a6b3f62006a5ba26882be/author/0"><span itemprop="name">N. Potrafke</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information"><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationIssue" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><em><span itemprop="journal">The World Economy</span>, </em> <em><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationVolume" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><span itemprop="volumeNumber">38 </span></span>(<span itemprop="issueNumber">3</span>):
<span itemprop="pagination">509--552</span></em> </span>(<em><span>Mai 2014<meta content="Mai 2014" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Sun May 20 18:41:32 CEST 2018The World Economymay3509--552The Evidence on Globalisation382014Globalisierung KOF PoWi Abstract Globalisation is blamed for many socioeconomic shortcomings. I discuss the consequences of globalisation by surveying the empirical globalisation literature. My focus is on the KOF indices of globalisation that have been used in more than 100 studies. Early studies using the KOF index reported correlations between globalisation and several outcome variables. Studies published more recently identify causal effects. The evidence shows that globalisation has spurred economic growth, promoted gender equality and improved human rights. Moreover, globalisation did not erode welfare state activities, did not have any significant effect on labour market interaction and hardly influenced market deregulation. It increased, however, within?country income inequality. The consequences of globalisation thus turn out to be overall much more favourable than often conjectured in the public discourse.Measuring Globalisation: OECD Economic Globalisation Indicators 2010https://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/288bb94d051321803857514aff2f8a05e/ziegmaziegma2018-05-02T16:18:14+02:00GlobalisationIndex PoWi <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title=" OECD" itemprop="url" href="/person/1f5021ff974537e2847affd03baece7ea/author/0"><span itemprop="name">OECD</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information">(<em><span>2010<meta content="2010" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Wed May 02 16:18:14 CEST 2018Measuring Globalisation: OECD Economic Globalisation Indicators 20102010GlobalisationIndex PoWi Globalisation Continues: The Maastricht Globalisation Index Revisited and Updatedhttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/23e41252daa956e1ce479fbd5b6fc21f2/ziegmaziegma2018-05-02T16:12:15+02:00GlobalisationIndex PoWi <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Lukas Figge" itemprop="url" href="/person/16cc887db2324386ee746f4879c4d9dd9/author/0"><span itemprop="name">L. Figge</span></a></span>, </span> und <span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Pim Martens" itemprop="url" href="/person/16cc887db2324386ee746f4879c4d9dd9/author/1"><span itemprop="name">P. Martens</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information"><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationIssue" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><em><span itemprop="journal">Globalizations</span>, </em> <em><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationVolume" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><span itemprop="volumeNumber">11 </span></span>(<span itemprop="issueNumber">6</span>):
<span itemprop="pagination">875--893</span></em> </span>(<em><span>November 2014<meta content="November 2014" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Wed May 02 16:12:15 CEST 2018Globalizationsnov6875--893Globalisation Continues: The Maastricht Globalisation Index Revisited and Updated112014GlobalisationIndex PoWi Going Public as a Legislative Weapon: Measuring Presidential Appeals Regarding Specific Legislationhttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/2032292755ab6086cb5ff22be9c6176b8/ziegmaziegma2018-05-02T12:19:45+02:00Leg-Exek-Beziehung PoWi USA <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Andrew W. Barrett" itemprop="url" href="/person/1f5a760c3bb651bd51b6dd55e461c365b/author/0"><span itemprop="name">A. Barrett</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information"><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationIssue" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><em><span itemprop="journal">Presidential Studies Quarterly</span>, </em> <em><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationVolume" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><span itemprop="volumeNumber">35 </span></span>(<span itemprop="issueNumber">1</span>):
<span itemprop="pagination">1-10</span></em> </span>(<em><span>2005<meta content="2005" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Wed May 02 12:19:45 CEST 2018Presidential Studies Quarterly11-10Going Public as a Legislative Weapon: Measuring Presidential Appeals Regarding Specific Legislation352005Leg-Exek-Beziehung PoWi USA This article examines the public appeals of three modern presidents (Carter, Reagan, and the first Bush) concerning 253 significant pieces of legislation. It shows that these occupants of the Oval Office took their case to the American people only a few times regarding most of the bills examined. This finding holds across a number of measures of presidential appeals, including general appeals, calls for public and congressional action, television and radio appeals, and appeals made outside of Washington, DC. The presidents analyzed were more likely to speak in support of rather than in opposition to legislation, however. They also went public repeatedly regarding a handful of proposals, particularly their own initiatives.Assessing the Power of the Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Institutionshttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/2af039ae95c66e1d8a8419b1056b7d475/ziegmaziegma2018-05-02T12:03:21+02:00Leg-Exek-Beziehung PoWi <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Joachim Wehner" itemprop="url" href="/person/13345493ed1b39c961a76ed18384c90d0/author/0"><span itemprop="name">J. Wehner</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information"><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationIssue" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><em><span itemprop="journal">Political Studies</span>, </em> <em><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationVolume" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><span itemprop="volumeNumber">54 </span></span>(<span itemprop="issueNumber">4</span>):
<span itemprop="pagination">767--785</span></em> </span>(<em><span>Dezember 2006<meta content="Dezember 2006" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Wed May 02 12:03:21 CEST 2018Political Studiesdec4767--785Assessing the Power of the Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Institutions542006Leg-Exek-Beziehung PoWi Legislative control over the executive in Latin American presidential systems : executive-legislative institutional relationship during the stabilization and structural adjustment measures commonly known as Washington Consensus, Legislative Kontrolle über die Exekutive in lateinamerikanischen Präsidialsystemenhttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/276c9af8ff34517b3c53d623ab9ea8206/ziegmaziegma2018-05-02T11:49:11+02:00@diss Leg-Exek-Beziehung PoWi <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Ivo Hernández-Mirabal" itemprop="url" href="/person/1d648ccac60a348d9fff18ff55f7c349c/author/0"><span itemprop="name">I. Hernández-Mirabal</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information">(<em><span>2004<meta content="2004" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Wed May 02 11:49:11 CEST 2018Legislative control over the executive in Latin American presidential systems : executive-legislative institutional relationship during the stabilization and structural adjustment measures commonly known as Washington Consensus, Legislative Kontrolle über die Exekutive in lateinamerikanischen PräsidialsystemenDissertation2004@diss Leg-Exek-Beziehung PoWi Die institutionellen Beziehungen zwischen Exekutive und Legislative während der Stabilisierungs- und Umstrukturierungsmassnahmen des sogenannten „Washington Consensus“. Die Fälle der Privatisierung in Argentinien und Venezuela. 
 
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit einer paradigmatischen Debatte der zeitgenössischen Politikwissenschaft: die Diskussion der relativen Bedeutung institutioneller und struktureller Kontrolle über die politische Agenda (selbst wenn es sich um eine international vereinbarte handelt); die Wahl- oder Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten der politischen Akteure und die institutionellen Kanäle zur Umsetzung dieser Entscheidungen. In anderen Worten ausgedrückt handelt es sich um den Versuch, ein Erklärungsmuster sowohl für die Möglichkeiten der Staatsreform als auch für die institutionellen Reaktionen der Legislative zu finden. Die Arbeit legt dar, dass die Rolle der Legislative in den lateinamerikanischen Präsidialsystemen bei der Umsetzung oder dem Widerstand gegen die Reformen, abgesehen von einer Reihe von Studie, die sich mit der turbulenten Zeit der strukturellen Anpassungsmassnahmen befassen, bisher kontinuierlich stark vernachlässigt worden ist, unter anderem aufgrund ihrer angenommenen institutionellen Schwäche. 
Im Fall der präsidentiellen Demokratien Lateinamerikas existiert die Tradititon eines starken Präsidenten im Gegensatz zu einem schwachen Parlament, die sich aus einer kontinuierlichen Reihe von Interaktionen heraus gebildet hat und zu einem grossen Paradox führt: ungleiche Kräfte können sich nicht gegenseitig kontrollieren, selbst wenn sie normativ als Veto-Akteure angelegt sind. Die in den verschiedenen Verfassungen der Region so unterschiedlich ausgestattete Legislative war nicht in der Lage, ihre zweite wichtige Funktion nach der Gesetzgebung zu erfüllen: die Kontrolle der exekutiven Gewalt und deren Entscheidungen. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt beleuchtet eine Untersuchung der legislativen Kräfte in Lateinamerika strukturelle und funktionale Einschränkungen, die einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf die „Policy Production“ haben. Obgleich es sich im Vergleich zur Exekutive, die es beobachten und kontrollieren soll, um eine historisch und funktional geschwächte Gewalt handelt, kann die Legislative durch die Anwendung regulärer und ausserordentlicher legaler Ressourcen ihr Gewicht in politischen Verhandlungen spürbar werden lassen. 
Die Durchführung jedweder Privatisierungsmassnahme erfordert nach den Verfassungen der Region eine bewusste Beteiligung von parlamentarischen Mehrheiten und eine reformwillige Exekutive. Privatisierung bedeutete in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren eine vollständige Policy-Innovation, die sowohl in Argentinien als auch in Venezuela einen neuen Gesetzes- und Regelkorpus und somit auch ein Abstimmen der Ziele und Vorhaben der Legislative und der Exekutive erforderlich machte. Die Idee, staatliche Unternehmen an private Investoren zu verkaufen, stand im Gegensatz zur existierenden Gesetzgebung, die seit mehr als 50 Jahren auf einem staatlich gelenkten Entwicklungsmodell basierte. Die sogenannte „dezentralisierte Verwaltung“ der staatlich geführten Unternehmen hatte das gesamte Konzept des Staates und der politischen Kräfte geformt. Das Reformvorhaben musste unter diesen Umständen zu einer gemeinsamen Idee für unterschiedliche politische Kräfte und gesellschaftliche Sektoren werden. Das bisherige Entwicklungsmodell war im konstitutionellen und institutionellen Gerüst der für diese Studie ausgewählten Länder unterschiedlich tief verwurzelt, in beiden Fällen aber zum Zeitpunkt der von Pérez respektive Ménem eingeführten Reformen fest etabliert., This study addresses a paradigmatic debate in contemporary political science: the discussion about the relative importance of institutional and structural constraints against the political agenda (even if it is an internationally agreed one), and the choice or decision making possibilities political actors have, plus the institutional channels that exist to express these decisions. In other words, the research seeks a pattern oriented to explain the possibilities of reforming the state, and the institutional reactions presented by the legislative. The enquiry suggests that aside from a number of investigations done to explain the turbulent decades when structural adjustments took place, the role of the legislative (in passing or stopping many of these reforms) in the presidentialist democracies of Latin America has been enormously and continuously overlooked, because among other reasons, of its supposed weakness. 
In the case of Latin American presidentialist democracies, the historic tradition of the strong president together with a light parliamentary figure, developed throughout a continuous set of interactions and led to a great paradox: unequal powers cannot control each other despite being normatively conceived as mutual veto actors. The legislative, so asymmetrically equipped in the several constitutions of the region, could not perform its other main function aside from legislating, that is, the control of the executive power and its decisions. This being said, a deliberate focus on the legislative powers in Latin America, brings out to light structural and functional constraints that do have a determinant and radical effect in the outcome of policy production. Despite being a seemingly historically and functionally weakened power in comparison to the executive it ought to observe and control, legislatives can apply a number of legal and extra legal resources to make their weight distinguishable in political negotiations. 
The approval of any privatization initiative implies a deliberate involvement, so foreseen in the constitutions of the region, of parliament majorities plus willing executives. Privatization meant during the 1980’s and the 1990’s, a complete policy innovation that required a new legal and regulative corpus both in Argentina and Venezuela and a synchronization of the executive-legislative aims and purposes to produce it. Interestingly, the idea of selling public industries to private investors represented a contradiction to the existing legal frame of a state and a society based on a state-led development model for over 50 years. The so-called decentralized administration, namely, the state owned enterprises had forged a complete conception of the state and the political forces. Under these circumstances, the reform program, to be able to take off, had to manage to become an institutionally common idea for diverse political forces and social sectors. The roots of the former inward development model had diverse depths in the constitutional and institutional design of the two countries chosen for this study, but in both cases it was mature and well ingrained at the time when Pérez and Ménem started to apply reforms: in Argentina throughout the decades after the war, and in Venezuela, most strongly after the 70’s and Pérez's bizarre proposition of the Gran Venezuela.The Power of Positive Sanctionshttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/25d13005cb64a71e2bbe5affaed9309da/ziegmaziegma2018-04-19T17:28:16+02:00Macht PoWi PoliticalTheory Power Sanktionen sanctions <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="David A. Baldwin" itemprop="url" href="/person/166bd0ca06889eddd551a7ee7c364739f/author/0"><span itemprop="name">D. Baldwin</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information"><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationIssue" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><em><span itemprop="journal">World Politics</span>, </em> <em><span itemtype="http://schema.org/PublicationVolume" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><span itemprop="volumeNumber">24 </span></span>(<span itemprop="issueNumber">1</span>):
<span itemprop="pagination">19–38</span></em> </span>(<em><span>1971<meta content="1971" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Thu Apr 19 17:28:16 CEST 2018World Politics119–38The Power of Positive Sanctions241971Macht PoWi PoliticalTheory Power Sanktionen sanctions How not to (mis)understand political identity in the European Unionhttps://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/2a322529e48d9a5dbfbd9a714893a391d/ziegmaziegma2018-04-19T16:36:10+02:00EU Identität Legitimität PoWi <span data-person-type="author" class="authorEditorList "><span><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="author"><a title="Furio Cerutti" itemprop="url" href="/person/1e6e01296501991492a9f4f6507d1da11/author/0"><span itemprop="name">F. Cerutti</span></a></span></span>. </span><span class="additional-entrytype-information"><span itemtype="http://schema.org/Book" itemscope="itemscope" itemprop="isPartOf"><em><span itemprop="name">Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union</span>, </em><em>Kapitel 1, </em><em><span itemprop="publisher">Routlege</span>, </em><em>Abingdon and New York, </em><em><span itemprop="bookEdition">1</span> Edition, </em></span>(<em><span>2011<meta content="2011" itemprop="datePublished"/></span></em>)</span>Thu Apr 19 16:36:10 CEST 2018Abingdon and New YorkDebating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union113-15How not to (mis)understand political identity in the European Union2011EU Identität Legitimität PoWi