We analyze the duration of large economic declines and provide a theory of delayed recovery. We show theoretically that uncertain post-recovery incomes lead to a commitment problem which limits the possibility of cooperation in ethnically heterogeneous countries. Strong constraints on the executive solve this problem by reducing the uncertainty associated with cooperative behavior. We test the model using standard data on linguistic heterogeneity and detailed data on ethnic power configurations. Our findings support the central theoretical prediction: countries with more constrained political executives experience shorter economic declines. The effect is large in ethnically heterogeneous countries but virtually non-existent in homogeneous societies. Our main results are robust to a variety of perturbations regarding the estimation method, the estimation sample, measures of heterogeneity, and measures of institutions.
%0 Journal Article
%1 bluhm_thomsson_2020
%A Bluhm, Richard
%A Thomsson, Kaj
%D 2020
%J Journal of Development Economics
%K crises development growth
%P 102457
%R https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102457
%T Holding on? Ethnic divisions, political institutions and the duration of economic declines
%U https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387820300328
%V 144
%X We analyze the duration of large economic declines and provide a theory of delayed recovery. We show theoretically that uncertain post-recovery incomes lead to a commitment problem which limits the possibility of cooperation in ethnically heterogeneous countries. Strong constraints on the executive solve this problem by reducing the uncertainty associated with cooperative behavior. We test the model using standard data on linguistic heterogeneity and detailed data on ethnic power configurations. Our findings support the central theoretical prediction: countries with more constrained political executives experience shorter economic declines. The effect is large in ethnically heterogeneous countries but virtually non-existent in homogeneous societies. Our main results are robust to a variety of perturbations regarding the estimation method, the estimation sample, measures of heterogeneity, and measures of institutions.
@article{bluhm_thomsson_2020,
abstract = {We analyze the duration of large economic declines and provide a theory of delayed recovery. We show theoretically that uncertain post-recovery incomes lead to a commitment problem which limits the possibility of cooperation in ethnically heterogeneous countries. Strong constraints on the executive solve this problem by reducing the uncertainty associated with cooperative behavior. We test the model using standard data on linguistic heterogeneity and detailed data on ethnic power configurations. Our findings support the central theoretical prediction: countries with more constrained political executives experience shorter economic declines. The effect is large in ethnically heterogeneous countries but virtually non-existent in homogeneous societies. Our main results are robust to a variety of perturbations regarding the estimation method, the estimation sample, measures of heterogeneity, and measures of institutions.},
added-at = {2022-08-24T10:42:51.000+0200},
author = {Bluhm, Richard and Thomsson, Kaj},
biburl = {https://puma.ub.uni-stuttgart.de/bibtex/25afde6e986dd12380d68214ae6128c1d/richardbluhm},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102457},
interhash = {613000b480758030fcb9aa60a32ec49c},
intrahash = {5afde6e986dd12380d68214ae6128c1d},
issn = {0304-3878},
journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
keywords = {crises development growth},
pages = 102457,
timestamp = {2022-08-24T08:42:51.000+0200},
title = {Holding on? Ethnic divisions, political institutions and the duration of economic declines},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387820300328},
volume = 144,
year = 2020
}
